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 BRIEF FOR 
PROFESSOR WALTER DELLINGER 
AS AMICUS CURIAE IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS 
 This brief is submitted on behalf of Professor 
Walter Dellinger.1 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 Walter Dellinger is the Douglas B. Maggs Profes-
sor Emeritus of Law at Duke University.2  Professor 
Dellinger has studied the scope of the Article III 
jurisdiction of federal courts, including issues relating 
to Article III standing.  He likewise has studied the 
scope of judicial review under the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.  Based on 
his study of the applicable precedent and principles, 
he believes that none of the respondent States has 
standing to challenge the November 20, 2014 memo-
randum on immigration enforcement issued by the 
 
 
 1 All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.   
No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, 
and no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribu-
tion intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.  
No person other than amicus curiae or his counsel made a 
monetary contribution to the preparation or submission of 
this brief.  Although Professor Dellinger is also a partner at 
O’Melveny & Myers, LLP, which is pro bono co-counsel for 
intervenors-respondents Jane Does, Professor Dellinger did not 
participate in the drafting of that brief. 
 2 The institutional affiliation is listed for identification 
purposes only. 
2 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
(Guidance), and that the APA does not provide them a 
cause of action. 
 Professor Dellinger filed an amicus brief in 
support of respondents on the issue of standing in 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
  
3 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
 This Court draws much of its legitimacy from 
deciding not to decide.  The Court “is vested with the 
‘Power’ to resolve not questions and issues but ‘Cases’ 
or ‘Controversies.’ ” Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. 
v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 132 (2011).  “Continued adher-
ence to the case-or-controversy requirement of Article 
III maintains the public’s confidence in an unelected 
but restrained Federal Judiciary.”  Id. at 133.  For 
“[i]f a dispute is not a proper case or controversy,” its 
resolution is committed to the political and legislative 
process, and “the courts have no business deciding it, 
or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”  
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 
(2006). 
 These principles are at their most salient here, 
where “[t]he public is currently engaged in an active 
political debate over” this subject matter.  Hollings-
worth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.  Indeed, this case has all 
the trappings of an epic political battle.  More than 
half the States are arrayed against the federal gov-
ernment.  Many other States take the opposite view 
and argue they are affirmatively harmed by the 
injunction imposed at the behest of the first group of 
States.  At issue is immigration, one of the most 
divisive, ideologically charged questions of our day.  
And the case arrives at this Court in the midst of a 
presidential election campaign in which the very 
policy challenged here is a central issue of contention. 
4 
 Given the political electricity pulsing through 
this case, the Court must take extra care to deter-
mine whether it is a “Case[ ]” that can be decided by 
the federal judiciary, and, even if so, whether any 
cause of action provides a basis for review.  Applica-
tion of long-settled principles yields but one answer to 
those questions:  no.  The purported injuries respond-
ents assert are both self-imposed and non-concrete, 
and the policy they challenge is a quintessential case 
of enforcement discretion.  The dispute accordingly 
presents only “questions and issues” (Winn, 563 U.S. 
at 132) that must be left to the political process. 
 To hold otherwise would not only inject the Court 
into this political maelstrom, but also the next one, 
and the next.  For the theory of standing advanced 
by respondents here would not be good for this case 
only.  If adopted, it would open wide a back door to 
federal court for States seeking resolution of a host of 
politically charged disputes where the front door to 
individual plaintiffs has been barred by this Court’s 
precedents.  Respondents’ novel theory of APA review 
would likewise place the courts in a supervisory 
status over a wide range of discretionary executive 
decisions, without any meaningful standards for 
evaluating them. 
 The judgment of the court of appeals should be 
reversed. 
  
5 
ARGUMENT 
I. RESPONDENT STATES LACK ARTICLE 
III STANDING 
 Article III of the Constitution gives federal courts 
the power to resolve only “Cases” and “Controversies.”  
That limited power allows a federal court to settle 
disputes only if the party before it “seek[s] a remedy 
for a personal and tangible harm.”  Hollingsworth, 
133 S. Ct. at 2661.  “Vindicating the public interest 
(including the public interest in Government obser-
vance of the Constitution and laws) is the function of 
Congress and the Chief Executive.”  Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). 
 To have the personal stake required by Article 
III, a party must show, at a minimum, that (1) it has 
suffered an “injury in fact—an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particu-
larized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical”; (2) there is “a causal connection be-
tween the injury and the conduct complained of—the 
injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged 
action of the defendant”; and (3) it is “likely” that “the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”  Id. 
at 560 (quotation marks, alterations, and citations 
omitted). 
 Respondents cannot make that showing here 
because their alleged injuries are not fairly traceable 
to the Guidance and are neither concrete nor particu-
larized.  Allowing the Fifth Circuit’s contrary conclu-
sion to stand would open federal courts to a flood of 
6 
political litigation that this Court’s standing prece-
dent has until now barred. 
A. Respondents Fail To Show That Any In-
jury Is Fairly Traceable To The Guidance 
 Respondents do not have standing to sue the 
United States because they cannot show an injury 
that is fairly traceable to the challenged Guidance.  
Any injury they suffer—if indeed there is one, cf. 
infra Section I.B—is instead the result of their own 
voluntary choices.  Such self-imposed “injury” has 
never provided a ticket to federal court. 
 1. When “the plaintiff is [itself] an object of the 
action (or forgone action)” it wishes to challenge, 
“there is ordinarily little question that the action or 
inaction has caused [it] injury, and that a judgment 
preventing or requiring the action will redress it.”  
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62.  But when 
“a plaintiff ’s asserted injury arises from the govern-
ment’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of 
regulation) of someone else, much more is needed.”  
Id. at 562.  The “standing” of the non-regulated 
plaintiff “is ordinarily substantially more difficult to 
establish.”  Ibid. (quotation marks omitted).  When 
the plaintiff seeks to challenge a decision not to 
prosecute someone else, the obstacle to standing is 
insurmountable.  Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 
614, 619 (1973).  And, as particularly relevant here, a 
plaintiff lacks any “judicially cognizable interest in 
procuring enforcement of the immigration laws” 
against another.  Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 
883, 897 (1984). 
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 Respondents, who are not the object of the Guid-
ance or at all regulated by it, fall well short of sur-
mounting these obstacles.  The “subsidized driver’s 
license” injury to Texas on which the Fifth Circuit re-
lied is self-imposed and therefore not fairly traceable 
to the federal action respondents seek to challenge. 
 Texas’s theory of standing goes like this.  Under 
Texas law, non-citizens may apply for a driver’s 
license if they present “documentation issued by the 
appropriate United States agency that authorizes the 
applicant to be in the United States.”  Tex. Transp. 
Code § 521.142(a).  Texas has chosen to construe this 
statute to cover “documentation” that an alien receives 
when granted “deferred action.”  Tex. Dep’t of Pub. 
Safety, Verifying Lawful Presence 4 (July 2013).  Texas 
charges $24 to issue a driver’s license, Tex. Transp. 
Code § 521.421(a-3), an amount Texas contends is 
below its actual cost, Pet. App. 20a-21a.  Texas posits 
that because of the Guidance more Texas residents 
would be eligible for driver’s licenses and thus apply 
to receive them.  And because Texas subsidizes each 
license it issues, Texas will spend more money as a 
result of the Guidance.  That supposed pocket-book 
injury, the argument goes, gives Texas standing to 
challenge the Guidance.3 
 
 3 Although here the State decided to tie its subsidy to 
federal documentation before the federal government expanded 
the policy that the State wishes to challenge, there is nothing in 
the logic of respondents’ standing theory that requires that 
sequence.  The same theory of standing would seemingly hold 
(Continued on following page) 
8 
 That chain of causation is broken at its very first 
link—Texas’s voluntary choice to confer a state subsi-
dy (for a driver’s license) based on a federal policy (of 
granting deferred action and accompanying documen-
tation to an alien).  When Texas made that choice, it 
understood that the federal government historically 
had granted deferred action to different categories of 
aliens over time and presumably would continue to do 
so.  Yet the State still voluntarily chose to tie its 
subsidy to another sovereign’s choices.  And after the 
scope of the federal policy did in fact expand, Texas 
has voluntarily adhered to its decision to confer a 
state subsidy based on federal documentation.  Those 
voluntary choices by Texas, rather than any federal 
action, are the legally cognizable cause of any in-
creased state expenditures on driver’s licenses. 
 Texas and other States that have made that 
choice are thus just like Pennsylvania in Pennsylva-
nia v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam).  
There, the Pennsylvania legislature had voluntarily 
provided a Pennsylvania tax credit for taxes Penn-
sylvania residents paid to New Jersey.  Id. at 663.  
Pennsylvania then attempted to sue New Jersey, 
claiming that New Jersey’s tax on Pennsylvania 
residents was unlawful.  Pennsylvania asserted it 
was injured because the challenged New Jersey tax 
 
even if Texas had adopted its current driver’s-licensing scheme 
after issuance of the Guidance.  In both instances, any “injury” 
from a change to federal practice would be self-imposed. 
9 
resulted in decreased revenue for Pennsylvania due 
to increased Pennsylvania tax credits. 
 This Court held that Pennsylvania had no stand-
ing to sue because any injury related to New Jersey’s 
tax was “self-inflicted.”  Id. at 664.  The Court ob-
served that “nothing prevents Pennsylvania from 
withdrawing that credit for taxes paid to New Jer-
sey.”  Ibid.  Any harm to the Pennsylvania fisc was 
therefore not fairly traceable to New Jersey but 
instead to its own decision not to withdraw the tax 
credit.  “No State can be heard to complain about 
damage inflicted by its own hand.”  Ibid.4 
 So too here.  Texas was not required to offer a 
subsidy to driver’s-license applicants based on federal 
documentation of deferred-action status.  Having 
voluntarily ceded to another sovereign the effective 
decision regarding which parties merit such a subsidy, 
Texas has no right to complain in federal court that it 
is now unhappy with that other sovereign’s choice.5 
 
 4 Although the Court in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey framed 
the issue as one of causation, one could equally view a self-
imposed “injury” as no cognizable injury at all.  Either way, a 
self-imposed injury would not satisfy Article III’s case-or-
controversy requirement. 
 5 Respondents attempt to avoid the “self-inflicted injury” 
problem with their theory of standing by relying on Wyoming v. 
Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992), Br. in Opp. 15-16, but that effort 
fails.  That case did not involve a sovereign’s attempt to challenge 
another sovereign’s law on which the first sovereign had volun-
tarily based eligibility for a benefit.  The situation was just the 
opposite: the challenged Oklahoma statute explicitly targeted 
(Continued on following page) 
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 2. Respondents’ theory of standing would not 
only provide a basis for States to challenge myriad 
federal immigration decisions, see Pet. Br. 31, but it 
would also provide a ready work-around in many 
other cases where courts have found that individual 
plaintiffs lacked standing.  By following the path laid 
out by respondents here, States could effectively step 
into those individual plaintiffs’ shoes and litigate 
policy disputes with the federal government.  That 
would turn standing doctrine on its head.  This Court 
has long recognized that “[a] State does not have 
standing as parens patriae to bring an action against 
the Federal Government.”  Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 
Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16 (1982) 
(citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 
(1923), and Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 
(1901)).  A State therefore has no standing to raise 
individual plaintiffs’ claims even when the individu-
als would have standing.  If no individual would have 
standing, it should therefore follow a fortiori that a 
State would not either. 
 The Texas work-around could be applied, for 
example, to evade the courts’ consistent holdings that 
plaintiffs do not have standing to challenge others’ 
tax exemptions.  For example, in Allen v. Wright, 468 
 
Wyoming for discrimination and Wyoming filed suit to defend 
itself.  See Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 443.  There is a reason why the 
later-decided Wyoming v. Oklahoma did not cite Pennsylvania v. 
New Jersey:  the standing inquiries in the two cases are wholly 
unrelated. 
11 
U.S. 737 (1984), “[p]arents of black public school 
children allege[d]” that the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS) “ha[d] not adopted sufficient standards and 
procedures to fulfill its obligation to deny tax-exempt 
status to racially discriminatory private schools.”  Id. 
at 739.  They sought, among other things, “an injunc-
tion requiring the IRS to deny tax exemptions to a 
considerably broader class of private schools” than 
was the case under then-policy.  Id. at 747.  This 
Court held that plaintiffs lacked standing because the 
“line of causation between” the “IRS’s grant of tax 
exemptions to some racially discriminatory schools” 
and “desegregation of [plaintiffs’ children’s] schools 
[was] attenuated at best.”  Id. at 757. 
 Likewise, in Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare 
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976), this Court held that 
“[s]everal indigents and organizations composed of 
indigents” lacked standing to challenge an IRS reve-
nue ruling that confirmed a hospital’s Section 
501(c)(3) “charitable” status even though (the plain-
tiffs alleged) the hospital provided inadequate care to 
indigents.  Id. at 28, 37-45.  In particular, the Court 
held that it was “speculative” whether the revenue 
ruling would result in an increased denial of service 
to indigents.  Id. at 42. 
 And in In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 885 F.2d 
1020 (2d Cir. 1989), the Second Circuit held that 
abortion-rights groups lacked standing to challenge 
the tax-exempt status of the Roman Catholic 
Church based on its alleged political activities.  Id. at 
1022, 1031.  Among other things, the court held that 
12 
plaintiffs lacked “taxpayer standing” to challenge the 
IRS’s alleged failure to properly enforce rules govern-
ing 501(c)(3) organizations.  Id. at 1028; see also Am. 
Soc’y of Travel Agents, Inc. v. Blumenthal, 566 F.2d 
145, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (no standing to challenge 
tax-exempt status of American Jewish Congress). 
 Under respondents’ theory of standing in this 
case, however, States would have standing to assert 
all of these claims.  Many States choose to grant tax 
exemptions from their own state taxes to organiza-
tions that are tax exempt under federal law.  E.g., 
Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Tax-Exempt Organiza-
tions § 3.4 (11th ed. 2015); Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code 
§§ 23701-23712; Tex. Tax Code §§ 151.310(2), 171.063(a).  
That voluntary choice means that a State loses tax 
revenue when the IRS grants (or maintains) an 
entity’s tax-exempt status under 26 U.S.C. § 501(a), 
(c)(3).  If Texas has standing in this case, then that 
revenue impact would lead to state standing to chal-
lenge the IRS’s conferral of federal tax-exempt status 
on an entity or class of entities, such as the private 
schools in Allen, the hospitals in Eastern Kentucky 
Welfare Rights Organization, or the Roman Catholic 
Church in In re U.S. Catholic Conferences. 
 The opening of the standing back door would not 
be limited to challenges to tax-exempt status.  In 
Freedom from Religion Foundation v. Lew, 773 F.3d 
815 (7th Cir. 2014), the Seventh Circuit held that 
individual plaintiffs lacked standing to raise an Estab-
lishment Clause challenge to the “parsonage exemp-
tion,” which “excludes the value of employer-provided 
13 
housing benefits from the gross income of any ‘minis-
ter of the gospel’ ” for federal income tax purposes.  
Id. at 818 (quoting 26 U.S.C. § 107).  Nearly every 
State has opted to use federal gross income as the 
base for calculation of state income taxes.  See Ruth 
Mason, Delegating Up: State Conformity with the 
Federal Tax Base, 62 Duke L.J. 1267, 1269 (2013).  
Under respondents’ standing theory, any of those 
States would have standing to challenge the parson-
age exemption, any expansion of it, or any feature of 
federal tax law that lowers federal gross income on 
the ground that state income tax revenue has been 
reduced. 
 States voluntarily incorporate federal law or 
practices in myriad other ways.6  Many changes at 
the federal level will therefore inevitably have fiscal 
or other impacts on the States.  When a State does 
 
 6 Texas law alone offers many examples.  Texas provides free 
tuition and other subsidies to disabled veterans, borrowing the 
federal definition for who qualifies.  Tex. Educ. Code § 54.341; 
see Pet. Br. 32 (listing other examples).  If the federal govern-
ment were to change how it defines who is a disabled veteran, 
the effect on Texas’s budget would likely be far greater than in 
this case.  See also Tex. Educ. Code §§ 5.001(4), 29.153(b)(2) (re-
quiring school districts to offer free prekindergarten to children 
who meet federal standard for free or reduced-price lunch); 
id. § 54.241 (subsidized higher education for qualifying military 
personnel and their families); see generally F. Scott Boyd, 
Looking Glass Law: Legislation by Reference in the States, 68 La. 
L. Rev. 1201, 1262-73 (2008) (observing that “states have proba-
bly adopted federal law on almost every imaginable subject” and 
providing examples). 
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not like incorporated federal policy—whether because 
of the corresponding impact on its fisc or otherwise—
its proper recourse is through the political system.  
The State can seek relief either at the federal level, 
where it can press for a change in federal policy, or 
before its own legislature, where it can avoid the 
fiscal impact by exercising its sovereign prerogative 
to modify or abandon its reliance on federal law.  It 
cannot, however, properly use its voluntary incorpo-
ration of federal actions to create an end-run around 
established rules of Article III jurisdiction. 
 The court of appeals was untroubled by such 
possibilities because it thought it “pure speculation” 
that respondents or other States “would sue about 
matters such as * * * IRS revenue ruling[s].”  Pet. 
App. 35a.  But just as this Court “would not uphold 
an unconstitutional statute merely because the 
Government promised to use it responsibly,” United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 480 (2010), the Court 
should not find Article III satisfied merely because 
plaintiffs promise not to irresponsibly use a relaxa-
tion of standing requirements in future cases. 
 3. In each of the preceding examples, and many 
others, the State could simply avoid the alleged 
injury by changing its laws so that they no longer 
incorporate another sovereign’s choices.  The Fifth 
Circuit thought that the need for such a change 
would itself be a harm caused by federal policy—
according to that court, the Guidance placed “sub-
stantial pressure” on Texas to change its driver’s-
license law, thus giving Texas standing.  Pet. App. 16a.  
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If such “pressure” conferred standing, it would lead 
to the radical conclusion that a State would have 
standing whenever it adopts federal classifications, 
including in every one of the scenarios discussed 
above.  See supra pp. 12-13 & n.6.  The same pressure 
was present in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, yet the 
Court still held that Pennsylvania’s “self-inflicted” 
injury could not be the basis for standing.  426 U.S. at 
663-64.  In particular, the Court held that the answer 
to Pennsylvania’s injury was not a federal lawsuit but 
Pennsylvania’s “withdrawing [its] credit for taxes paid 
to New Jersey.”  Id. at 664.  The “pressure” to take 
that legislative step provided no basis for standing; 
“[n]o sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests” of the 
State were “implicated.”  Id. at 666.  Nor are they 
here. 
 That there may be constitutional or other limits 
on Texas’s options for changing its driver’s-license 
program to avoid its self-imposed “harm” does not 
change the analysis.  See Pet. Br. 28.  Those exoge-
nous constraints do not arise from the Guidance and 
are therefore not relevant to the question of respond-
ents’ standing to challenge it.  The Pennsylvania 
legislature would have likewise faced constraints on 
its ability to change its tax scheme in Pennsylvania v. 
New Jersey.  See Comptroller of the Treasury v. 
Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1805-06 (2015) (holding that 
Maryland violated the dormant aspect of the Com-
merce Clause by refusing to grant a tax credit for 
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taxes paid to another State).7  Yet those external 
constraints did not alter the Court’s conclusion that 
Pennsylvania’s injury was “self-inflicted” and there-
fore provided no basis for standing. 
 It is pure speculation, moreover, that Texas is 
constrained from adopting its preferred licensing 
scheme because we do not even know what that 
scheme might be.  Texas asserts that it is forbidden 
by federal law from creating its own immigration 
classifications and that this somehow prevents it 
from achieving its policy goals.  Br. in Opp. 16.  To the 
contrary, nothing in the Guidance appears to prevent 
Texas from achieving the objectives reflected in 
its laws and regulations.  Current Texas law bases 
 
 7 In Wynne, Maryland taxed both the income that residents 
of other States earned from sources in Maryland and the income 
that Maryland residents earned from out-of-state sources.  135 
S. Ct. at 1792.  Because Maryland did not provide a full Mary-
land income tax credit for taxes its residents paid to other 
States, its scheme discriminated against interstate commerce by 
effectively taxing more heavily income earned elsewhere.  Id. at 
1803-04.  The Court explained that its conclusion was “all but 
dictate[d]” by three cases that predate the decision in Pennsyl-
vania v. New Jersey.  See id. at 1794-95 (citing J.D. Adams Mfg. 
Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307 (1938); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. 
Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); Cent. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. 
Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948)).  Thus, although Pennsylvania 
would have been free to drop its tax credit for income earned in 
New Jersey (and thus avoid its self-inflicted injury), the dor-
mant Commerce Clause likely would have required it to si-
multaneously drop any tax on income earned by New Jersey 
residents from Pennsylvania sources or forbear from adopting 
one.  See id. at 1806. 
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driver’s-license eligibility solely on the fact of the 
Secretary’s having issued “documentation” to an 
alien—without any qualification, such as a require-
ment that the issuance have been authorized by 
federal law.  Tex. Transp. Code § 521.142(a); Verifying 
Lawful Presence 1-5.  Aliens eligible for deferred 
action under the Guidance would have such “docu-
mentation” as a factual matter, and there is nothing 
on the face of the Texas statute (or the regulations 
interpreting it) indicating that providing them driv-
er’s licenses would conflict with any state policy.  And 
there are plausible reasons why Texas may have 
decided to rely on the fact of documentation: By 
accepting the federal government’s documentation as 
the trigger for a driver’s license, Texas avoids any 
need to independently investigate the conditions 
surrounding an alien’s immigration status. 
 If Texas has some other policy goal not apparent 
from its laws, it has failed to disclose it, much less 
explain how it might be thwarted.  Texas policy, of 
course, can only be determined from its existing 
statutes and regulations, or any new legislation or 
administrative rule; it cannot be articulated by its 
attorneys in a brief.  If Texas lawmakers desire a 
different policy, Texas is free to stop subsidizing all 
driver’s licenses, or to stop subsidizing those issued to 
aliens with deferred action, or to take any number of 
other actions.  See Pet. Br. 26.  Yet Texas has shown 
no interest in taking those steps.  Until Texas or 
another State actually takes some action toward 
adopting a different policy, federal courts are not a 
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proper forum for debating the issue.  See New Jersey 
v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328, 338 (1926) (holding that 
New Jersey lacked standing to challenge the Federal 
Water Power Act where “[t]here is no showing that 
the state is now engaged or about to engage in any 
work or operations which the act purports to prohibit 
or restrict, or that the defendants are interfering or 
about to interfere with any work or operations in 
which the state is engaged”). 
 In the hypothetical event Texas or another State 
were to adopt a policy of providing (or subsidizing) 
driver’s licenses for some, but not all, deferred action 
recipients, an aggrieved alien with deferred action 
could file suit to challenge that denial.  Such a reject-
ed license-seeker would of course have an injury and 
standing.  That would be a proper lawsuit for the 
determination of any limitations on state authority to 
carry out some other preferred policy.  To the extent 
that such a disappointed license applicant sought to 
rely upon the federal Guidance as a basis for chal-
lenging the license rejection, a State could argue in 
response that it was not required to give licenses to 
those aliens covered by the Guidance and, in the alter-
native, that the Guidance was invalid.  The issue would 
thus be joined in a conventional case undergirded by 
a real injury.  At present, however, respondents’ claim 
of injury is doubly speculative: we do not know 
whether Texas does wish to adopt any different policy, 
19 
and we do not know whether there is any reason it 
cannot do so.8 
B. Texas Has No Concrete, Particularized 
Injury That Is Either Actual Or Immi-
nent 
 Respondents lack standing for a second, inde-
pendent reason:  they fail to allege a concrete injury 
and therefore do not satisfy Article III.  Standing to 
sue requires a “distinct and palpable” injury, Allen, 
468 U.S. at 751, “to assure that concrete adverseness 
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which 
the court so largely depends for illumination,” Baker 
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).  A bare allegation 
that some action will require increased state spend-
ing does not establish a concrete injury; pointing to 
the costs of a state program “is just the beginning of 
the analysis.”  Winn, 563 U.S. at 137. 
 
 8 The circumstances of this case bear no resemblance to 
those in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent 
Restricting Commission, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015). Cf. Br. in Opp. 
19.  There, this Court held that the Arizona legislature had 
standing to challenge an Arizona constitutional amendment on 
redistricting, even though the legislature had yet to take any 
specific redistricting action that might have been barred by the 
challenged amendment.  Id. at 2663-65.  That was so because 
“any” redistricting action the legislature took “would directly 
and immediately conflict with the regime Arizona’s Constitution 
establishes.”  Id. at 2663-64 (emphasis added).  Here, by con-
trast, state lawmakers have numerous options for structuring 
their driver’s-license programs, as the diversity of existing state 
programs shows. 
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 1. This Court has repeatedly rejected standing 
to sue when plaintiffs allege the type of injury re-
spondents allege here—increased government spend-
ing.  See Br. in Opp. 12-13, 17 (claiming standing on 
the ground that the Guidance would “impose substan-
tial costs on [respondents’] driver’s-license programs” 
and would “cause [respondents] to incur healthcare, 
law-enforcement, and education costs”).  The Court 
has explained that when a government expends 
resources, “its budget does not necessarily suffer.”  
Winn, 563 U.S. at 136; see Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344.  “On 
the contrary, the purpose of many governmental 
expenditures and tax benefits is to ‘spur economic 
activity, which in turn increases government reve-
nues,’ ” or to provide other expected benefits.  Winn, 
563 U.S. at 136 (quoting Cuno, 547 U.S. at 344).  
Because a State has already undertaken its own cost-
benefit analysis before approving an expenditure, it is 
“conjectural or hypothetical” for taxpayers to assert 
that such costs are an injury.  See Cuno, 547 U.S. at 
344 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 Just as a taxpayer may not assert that a chal-
lenged policy creates an injury because it requires a 
State to spend money, a State that has itself already 
conducted the applicable cost-benefit analysis may 
not either.  In this case, the Texas legislature pre-
sumably acted rationally when it set the fee for 
driver’s licenses at a level that required a subsidy; 
that is, it saw offsetting benefits (e.g., safer roads, 
more drivers with automobile insurance, increased 
employment).  Texas is not the only State to make 
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that cost-benefit calculation.  Indeed, some States, 
including respondents Utah and Nevada, go further 
than Texas and offer driver’s licenses to immigrants 
regardless of their immigration status.  See Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-3-207; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 483.291(2)(b).9  
Presumably, those States too saw offsetting benefits 
from the costs of issuing additional licenses.  Texas 
has offered no reason, let alone evidence, why the 
balance of costs and offsetting benefits will be any 
different for people newly eligible for licenses because 
of the Guidance than for all of the other deferred-
action recipients whom Texas has long subsidized.  
See Intervenors’ Br. 33.  It has therefore failed to 
demonstrate a concrete injury. 
 If respondents were correct that increased state 
expenditures alone are an Article III injury, without 
regard to any of the other effects of the challenged 
action, then Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 
(2007), would have been an easy standing case.  The 
Environmental Protection Agency’s policy of not 
regulating greenhouse gas emissions from new motor 
vehicles almost certainly increased the costs of 
States like California that filled the gap with their 
 
 9 See also Nat’l Immigration Law Ctr., State Laws Providing 
Access to Driver’s Licenses or Cards, Regardless of Immigration 
Status 2-3 (July 2015), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/11/drivers-license-access-table-2015-07-01.pdf (listing other 
States); Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes or No Answer: A Plea to End 
the Oversimplification of the Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. 
& Pol. 435, 445-50 (2008) (discussing some of the policy ration-
ales). 
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own regulations.  See Cal. Health & Safety Code 
§ 43018.5(h) (California greenhouse-gas regulation 
may not be required if “the federal government 
adopts a standard regulating a greenhouse gas from 
new motor vehicles” of equal or better effectiveness); 
Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, & Green-
house Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 281, 282 
(2003).  California thus could have alleged a pocket-
book injury related to federal policy just as Texas does 
here (and could have relied on its voluntary incorpo-
ration of federal law to satisfy the causation require-
ment). 
 Such incidental state expenditures, however, 
have never been considered a cognizable injury for 
standing purposes.  The Fifth Circuit thought an in-
cidental increase in state expenditures must be 
sufficient because otherwise courts would be required 
to engage in impermissible “costs and benefits” anal-
ysis.  Pet. App. 23a.  But that overlooks the critical 
fact that Texas itself has already conducted that 
analysis, and found that benefits offset costs.  To 
nonetheless find an injury by looking at only one side 
of that ledger would be unwarranted.  See Winn, 563 
U.S. at 136-37. 
 The effects of recognizing a mere incidental 
increase to a State’s budget as a cognizable injury 
would be far-reaching.  Indeed, Texas asserts not only 
a burden on its budget from driver licensing, but also 
from its claim that it will increase spending on 
healthcare, education, and law enforcement as inci-
dental consequences of the Guidance.  Other States 
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will be able to assert the same burdens on their 
budgets as the result of virtually every federal policy.  
The result will be federal courts transformed into 
arenas for political battles between States and the 
federal government—and among the States them-
selves because in most such cases, as here, some 
States will conclude that the challenged federal policy 
is beneficial. 
 2. Importantly, Texas’s alleged financial injury 
is wholly unlike the state injury the Court accepted 
as a basis for standing in Massachusetts v. EPA, the 
case on which the Fifth Circuit relied to justify giving 
respondents “special solicitude” to assert their claim, 
Pet. App. 12a-20a.  Most fundamentally, no part of 
Massachusetts’ injury was self-imposed; unlike respon-
dents here, Massachusetts could not have avoided the 
harm it alleged by simply choosing not to extend a 
subsidy or incorporate federal law or practice. 
 Further, unlike in Massachusetts, the States here 
bring their claims under the generic cause of action in 
the APA, not under the kind of special judicial review 
provision the existence of which the Court in Massa-
chusetts deemed “of critical importance to the stand-
ing inquiry.”  549 U.S. at 516.  The Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) provides no such special “proce-
dural right” of judicial review to respondents.  To the 
contrary, “the removal process is entrusted to the 
discretion of the Federal Government,” not the States.  
Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2506 (2012).  
The INA provides only narrowly circumscribed paths 
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to judicial review—all for aliens, not States or other 
third parties.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
 Finally, Massachusetts’ injury went directly to its 
sovereignty as a State—its “well-founded desire to 
preserve its sovereign territory” from encroachment 
by a rising sea, as well as its personal stake in pre-
serving state-owned coastal lands.  Massachusetts, 
549 U.S. at 519, 522-23.  That some respondents may 
choose to subsidize immigrant driver’s licenses under 
a program their legislatures voluntarily implemented 
(or complain of other indirect and incidental effects of 
immigration) is not remotely comparable to Massa-
chusetts’ interest in the literal preservation of its 
sovereign territory. 
C. At The Least, Respondents Lack Stand-
ing To Challenge The Designation Of 
“Lawful Presence” Because They Have 
Not Alleged Any Injury Resulting From 
The Legal Effects Of That Designation 
 Respondents purport to challenge the Guidance’s 
statement that aliens with deferred action status are 
“lawfully present” in the United States.  Br. in Opp. 
21-23.  Apart from simply indicating that an alien 
will not be removed for so long as the federal govern-
ment continues to forbear from such removal, see Pet. 
Br. 37, however, the designation of “lawful presence” 
has only a very limited effect under federal law with 
respect to the aliens in question here—namely, it 
makes them eligible to apply for Social Security 
retirement and disability benefits, Medicare benefits, 
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and benefits under railroad-worker programs.  See 
Pet. Br. 8 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(2)-(4); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1.3(a)(4)(vi)). 
 Respondents have not even attempted to rely 
on deferred-action recipients’ potential eligibility for 
such federal benefits as a basis for any injury they 
purport to have suffered.  See Pet. App. 7a.  Properly 
so.  Federal administration of Social Security and like 
programs has nothing to do with state drivers’ licens-
ing or the other state expenditures respondents 
discuss.  Respondents have thus not tried to show any 
injury based on aliens’ potential benefits from such 
federal programs.  Accordingly, even assuming ar-
guendo that respondents have standing to challenge 
some other aspects of the Guidance, they plainly have 
no standing to challenge the designation of “lawful 
presence” and the potential ancillary extension of 
Social Security or other benefits to those with de-
ferred action. 
II. RESPONDENTS LACK A CAUSE OF ACTION 
UNDER THE APA 
 Even if respondents had Article III standing, 
their challenge to the Guidance would fail because 
they lack an APA cause of action for two independent 
reasons.  First, the choice to defer removal is “com-
mitted to agency discretion by law” and therefore 
immune from judicial review.  5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2).  
Second, respondents cannot show that the injury they 
complain of—increased spending on driver’s-license 
registrations—“falls within the ‘zone of interests’ 
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sought to be protected by” federal immigration laws.  
Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 883 
(1990). 
A. The Guidance Is An Exercise Of Prose-
cutorial Discretion That Is Committed 
To Agency Discretion By Law And 
Therefore Unreviewable 
 1. The APA bars review of decisions that are 
“committed to agency discretion by law.”  5 U.S.C. 
§ 701(a)(2).  This prohibition has deep roots in our 
tradition of limited judicial review.  See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170-71 (1803) 
(“Where the head of a department acts in a case, in 
which executive discretion is to be exercised; in which 
he is the mere organ of executive will; it is again 
repeated, that any application to a court to control, in 
any respect, his conduct, would be rejected without 
hesitation.”). 
 Exercises of enforcement discretion are in the 
heartland of that prohibition on APA review.  Indeed, 
the “Court has recognized on several occasions over 
many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute 
or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, 
is a decision generally committed to an agency’s 
absolute discretion.”  Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 
831 (1985).  An agency’s decision not to take enforce-
ment action is therefore “presumed immune from judi-
cial review under § 701(a)(2).”  Id. at 832.  To rebut 
that presumption of unreviewability, a party must 
show that Congress circumscribed agency discretion 
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by providing “meaningful standards for defining the 
limits of that discretion” such that a reviewing court 
has “ ‘law to apply.’ ”  Id. at 834-35; see Lincoln v. 
Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993) (“Congress may always 
circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by 
putting restrictions in the operative statutes * * * .”). 
 Sound reasons underlie the general non-
reviewability of the Executive’s enforcement discre-
tion.  Such decisions require an agency to perform “a 
complicated balancing of a number of factors which 
are peculiarly within its expertise”; to determine 
“whether it is likely to succeed in fulfilling its statu-
tory mandate”; to evaluate whether undertaking 
specific action “best fits the agency’s overall policies”; 
and to assess “whether the agency has enough re-
sources” to undertake an action at all.  Lincoln, 508 
U.S. at 193 (quotation marks omitted; quoting Heck-
ler, 470 U.S. at 831).  Such quintessentially discre-
tionary decisions are not amenable to judicial review. 
 That is particularly true here.  The “complicated 
balancing” an agency must perform when making 
enforcement decisions is especially delicate for immi-
gration:  “Immigration policy can affect trade, invest-
ment, tourism, and diplomatic relations for the entire 
Nation, as well as the perceptions and expectations of 
aliens in this country who seek the full protection of 
its laws.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498.  Undoubtedly 
for that reason, Congress has long conferred and 
protected executive discretion in immigration.  As 
this Court explained with regard to the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
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1996 (IIRIRA), Congress has passed numerous immi-
gration-related statutes “aimed at protecting the 
Executive’s discretion from the courts—indeed, that 
can fairly be said to be the theme” of IIRIRA.  Reno v. 
Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 
486 (1999) (“AADC”).  In AADC this Court inter-
preted 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to “give some measure of 
protection to ‘no deferred action’ decisions.”  Id. at 
485.  That is, even in cases where there is an agency 
enforcement action to remove—an action that would 
normally “provide[ ] a focus for judicial review,” 
Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832—Congress limited judicial 
review of agency decisions not to grant deferred 
action. 
 2. Faced with this settled rule of non-
reviewability, respondents appear to disclaim any 
challenge to the Secretary’s decision not to remove 
the individuals covered by the Guidance.  Br. in Opp. 
20 (no challenge to Secretary’s choice “deprioritizing 
removal for identified aliens”); see Pet. App. 44a 
(“Part of DAPA involves the Secretary’s decision—at 
least temporarily—not to enforce the immigration 
laws as to a class of what he deems to be low-priority 
illegal aliens.  But importantly, the states have not 
challenged the priority levels he has established, and 
neither the preliminary injunction nor compliance 
with the APA requires the Secretary to remove any 
alien or to alter his enforcement priorities.”  (footnote 
omitted)). 
 Respondents’ decision to eschew an explicit 
challenge to the decision to defer removal was a wise 
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one.  Deferred action involves non-binding and revo-
cable decisions not to remove aliens for a limited 
time.  AADC, 525 U.S. at 484-85.  These decisions, 
like the unreviewable agency decision in Heckler, 
require the Department of Homeland Security to 
calculate how to allocate limited resources, further 
overall policy goals, and fulfill its statutory mandate.  
They also require discretionary consideration of 
“immediate human concerns,” such as family rela-
tions and individual safety, as well as “international 
relations.”  Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499.  Because 
Congress gave no meaningful standards for limiting 
that discretion, there is no law to apply and the APA 
does not permit judicial review. 
 Instead of expressly challenging the Secretary’s 
decision not to remove certain categories of aliens, 
respondents purport to challenge only his “affirma-
tive acts of granting lawful presence and work-
authorization eligibility.”  Br. in Opp. 21.  But that 
linguistic characterization does not make the agency 
action that is the object of their challenge any more 
reviewable. 
 First, as noted above, the so-called “affirmative 
act of granting lawful presence” is not distinct from 
the decision to forebear removal.  See Pet. Br. 38.  
And the only legal consequence of the designation of 
“lawful presence” is to make aliens eligible to apply 
for Social Security and other benefits—an ancillary 
effect respondents have no standing to challenge.  See 
supra Section I.C. 
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 Second, the principal consequence flowing from 
the government’s decision to forbear removal about 
which respondents do complain—the eligibility to 
apply for work authorization—is not “conferred” by 
the Secretary’s Guidance.  That incidental conse-
quence is instead established by other statutes and 
regulations that were on the books for decades before 
the Guidance issued.  E.g., 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) 
(deferred-action recipients may apply for work au-
thorization); see also Pet. App. 110a-12a (King, J., 
dissenting) (discussing other examples).  An alien’s 
eligibility to apply for work authorization (which, if 
granted, will make it lawful for an employer to hire 
that alien, see 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A), (h)(3)) can be 
triggered by any number of discretionary enforcement 
decisions by the Secretary that are themselves com-
mitted to the Secretary’s discretion and therefore 
unreviewable, see Pet. Br. 40.  Accordingly, if such 
eligibility provided a basis for judicial review under 
the APA, Heckler and 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) would 
effectively become inapplicable in the immigration 
context.10 
  
 
 10 In their brief in opposition, respondents suggest that they 
are challenging the substantive correctness of the thirty-year-old 
work authorization regulation, at least as applied to classes of 
aliens specified by statute as eligible for work authorization.  Br. 
in Opp. 34-35.  The time for bringing such a challenge has long 
passed.  Pet. Br. 54-55. 
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 Respondents’ attempt to characterize their chal-
lenge as one to incidental consequences, not enforce-
ment discretion, is also incompatible with the INA’s 
judicial review scheme.  That statute prohibits an 
alien denied deferred action from seeking review of 
that decision.  Pet. Br. 41; 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).  Surely, 
an alien denied deferred action could not file suit 
under the APA and successfully claim he was seeking 
review not of that adverse deferred action decision 
but instead of his resulting ineligibility for work 
authorization.  If aliens—who have carefully circum-
scribed judicial review rights under the INA—could 
not bring an APA claim regarding incidental conse-
quences, surely a non-alien—with no INA judicial 
review rights of any kind—may not do so.  Cf. Block v. 
Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 347-48 (1984) 
(presence of a “complex and delicate” statutory 
scheme for administrative and judicial review at the 
behest of only certain parties demonstrates congres-
sional intent to “foreclose” APA suits by others). 
 3. Allowing review based on the label attached 
to a non-enforcement decision, or on incidental 
benefits or authorizations that can flow from it, would 
mark a dramatic departure from settled under-
standings of the limits of the APA cause of action.  
Many decisions not to enforce or prosecute can have 
collateral consequences.  For example, a government 
contractor may be suspended from bidding for new 
government contracts if it is indicted for certain 
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offenses.  48 C.F.R. §§ 9.407-1(b)(1), -2(b).11  If the 
Attorney General, in her discretion, decides to dis-
miss the indictment, then the disability is lifted.  The 
collateral benefit of the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion is the ability to bid for a government 
contract. 
 Under Heckler, the Attorney General’s decision to 
drop the indictment would clearly be unreviewable.  
Yet, by pursuing respondents’ theory of APA reviewa-
bility in this case, one of the company’s competitors 
for a government contract could nonetheless use the 
APA to challenge the Attorney General’s decision, 
contending that it was not actually challenging the 
non-prosecution but instead only the supposedly 
 
 11 Such provisions are commonplace.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1818(g)(1) (party indicted for certain offenses is barred from 
affiliating with a federally insured depository institution, and 
may not control an insured institution’s operations); 9 C.F.R. 
§ 439.52 (indicted chemical laboratory’s accreditation may be 
suspended); 13 C.F.R. § 108.1630(b)(2) (indicted broker may be 
suspended from dealing in debentures or trust certificates “while 
the charge is pending”); id. § 120.110(n) (business with associate 
under indictment ineligible for Small Business Administration 
business loan); id. § 120.660(b)(2) (indicted broker or dealer may 
be suspended from selling or dealing in regulated certificates); 
id. § 120.1711(b)(3) (similar for purchasing or dealing in pool 
loans, loan interests, or pool certificates); 19 C.F.R. § 118.21(a)(2) 
(operator of customs centralized examination station may be 
barred from operating facility while under indictment); 24 C.F.R. 
§ 202.5(j)(2) (lenders ineligible to participate in federal housing 
programs while under indictment); id. § 214.103(c) (also barring 
an indicted party from acting as a Housing and Urban Develop-
ment-approved counseling agency). 
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“affirmative act[ ]” (Br. in Opp. 21) of authorizing the 
contractor to bid on a new contract. 
B. Respondents Cannot Show An Injury 
Within The Zone Of Interests Congress 
Protected Under The INA 
 Respondents have no APA cause of action for the 
additional reason that their alleged injuries are not 
within the zone of interests protected under the INA.  
To bring an APA claim a plaintiff must establish that 
its alleged injury “falls within the ‘zone of interests’ 
sought to be protected by the statutory provision 
whose violation forms the legal basis” for its com-
plaint.  Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. at 883.  “In 
cases where the plaintiff is not itself the subject of the 
contested regulatory action, the test denies a right of 
review if the plaintiff ’s interests are so marginally 
related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit 
in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed 
that Congress intended to permit the suit.”  Clarke v. 
Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). 
 Respondents’ alleged injuries are too “marginally 
related” (ibid.) to any INA-protected interests to pass 
the test.  Indeed, they are wholly unrelated.  Respon-
dents claim they will suffer increased costs of admin-
istering state programs, such as subsidized driver’s 
licenses, for immigrants granted deferred action 
under the Secretary’s Guidance.  Yet nothing in the 
INA protects those interests:  “[T]he central concern of 
the INA is with the terms and conditions of admission 
to the country and the subsequent treatment of aliens 
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lawfully in the country.”  Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892 
(quotation marks and citation omitted).  Respondents 
acknowledge as much by pointing to Texas law, not 
the INA, when attempting to show that Texas “has a 
significant interest” in the challenged Guidance.  Br. 
in Opp. 27 & n.14. 
 This Court’s discussion of the zone-of-interests 
test in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP, 
562 U.S. 170 (2011), illuminates respondents’ failure 
to satisfy it.  In Thompson, the Court held that the 
zone-of-interests test (which it borrowed from APA 
law) should limit the class of plaintiffs who may bring 
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
78 Stat. 253, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 562 U.S. 177-
78.  The Court explained that application of this test 
was necessary to prevent “absurd consequences” that 
would follow from allowing anyone with Article III 
standing to sue.  Id. at 176-77.  For example, without 
the zone-of-interests test, “a shareholder would be 
able to sue a company for firing a valuable employee 
for racially discriminatory reasons, so long as he 
could show that the value of his stock decreased as a 
consequence.”  Id. at 177.  If anything, respondents’ 
claimed interests, such as holding down their spend-
ing on driver’s licenses, are even further afield from 
the INA than were those of the hypothetical share-
holder from Title VII.  The APA therefore provides 
them no cause of action. 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
court of appeals should be reversed. 
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